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RATIONAL IRRATIONALITY:
WHY PLAYING THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION AS A SCAPEGOAT
REDUCES THE SOCIAL COSTS OF
ARMCHAIR ECONOMICS
Joseph Siprut∗
INTRODUCTION

T

he World Trade Organization (“WTO”) may be one of the
most reviled institutions on the planet. If so, then this
villainous role is one that the WTO should happily continue to
play. This Article proposes a theoretical model of the political
economy of international trade that conceives of the WTO as
something more than a mere institution administering multilateral trade agreements. Like any regime of multilateral
agreements premised on reciprocity, the WTO promotes free
trade by mobilizing export interest groups to counteract the
pressures of domestic producer interest groups, thereby making
tariff reductions politically feasible.
But the WTO may serve the free trade cause in a less obvious
manner. As illustrated below, because the average voter believes that unrestricted free trade produces negative consequences, politicians may treat adherence to the multilateral
treaties administered by the WTO as a “necessary evil” to
achieve alternative goals deemed more acceptable by voters.
Because adherence to multilateral trade agreements will nevertheless increase the social wealth that flows from free trade,
politicians enjoy the best of all political worlds. Not only can
politicians take credit for an increasingly wealthy economy by
reference to particular domestic policies, but to appease voters
who dislike free trade and simply refuse to think otherwise,
politicians can plead deference to the WTO. Accordingly, supporting free trade agreements will remain, on balance, perfectly
consistent with self-interested political behavior.
∗ Joseph Siprut is a Chicago-based litigation attorney. Special thanks
are owed to John O. McGinnis, Bryan Caplan, John Hasnas, and William
Mock, Jr. for insightful discussions on this topic.
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To provide the theoretical underpinning for this model, this
Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains how free trade is an
outgrowth of human nature and makes the specialization of
labor possible. As the principle of comparative advantage illustrates, more wealth is created when individuals and nations
specialize in what each does best. By contrast, protectionist
policies undermine the benefits that flow from free trade, and
pose a threat to increased societal welfare.
As Part I illustrates, however, the true nature of democratic
systems is such that harmful legislation is often passed because
of the disproportionate influence of the interest groups that
stand to benefit from the legislation. In the context of international trade, protectionist tariffs may be erected because of the
concentrated lobbying efforts of the domestic producers who
face competition from foreign imports. Although this legislation
may impose social costs, the politicians who are in a position to
support such legislation will do so if it advances their personal
interests — i.e., if it increases the odds of reelection or enhances
personal stature.
Part II examines the nature of the WTO, which, it is argued,
operates as a solution to many of the problems canvassed in
Part I. The WTO makes tariff reduction politically feasible because, under a system of reciprocal tariff reductions, export interests have an incentive to mobilize. As Part II points out,
however, voters may firmly believe that free trade produces
negative consequences in the aggregate. Indeed, the theory of
“rational irrationality” posits that, not only do voters lack incentives to purchase information in order to stay informed on
political matters, but, when the private costs of error are de
minimus, voters will indulge their bliss beliefs and maintain
positions which are downright irrational. Because voters may
therefore cling to these anti-free trade beliefs even if information or evidence to the contrary is freely disseminated and is
otherwise obtainable at minimal cost, self-interested political
actors therefore have less incentive to repeal protectionist legislation. Part II concludes by arguing, however, that by treating
adherence to the WTO as a necessary evil to achieving ends
more popular with voters, the pursuit of increased market access remains politically feasible behavior.
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I. THE PROBLEM
A. What Are We Fighting For? The Benefits of Free Trade
Any attempt to adequately canvass the body of literature
demonstrating the beneficial effects of free trade would certainly be in vain.1 But to establish the theoretical base for subsequent sections of this Article, it is useful to discuss some of
the classic arguments for free trade and the costs of protectionism.
By their very nature, human beings “are motivated by utilitymaximizing considerations,” and “when an opportunity for mutual gain exists, ‘trade’ will take place.”2 Like other animals
that live in groups, humans gain resources by exchange.3 Declining marginal value motivates our exchange, and if the exchange is consecrated, both parties gain.4
Accordingly, if opportunities for exchange are maximized,
wealth increases because individuals gain incentives to create
1. See, e.g., DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 238 (1989) (“Few issues
elicit greater agreement among economists than the proposition that society’s
welfare is maximized when there is free trade.”). For economically sophisticated arguments against free trade, see ELHANAN HELPMAN & PAUL R.
KRUGMAN, MARKET STRUCTURE AND FOREIGN TRADE: INCREASING RETURNS,
IMPERFECT COMPETITION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY (1985); PAUL R.
KRUGMAN, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1990). For a further sampling
of anti-free trade literature, see Jim Chen, Globalization and Its Losers, 9
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 157, 159 (2000) (arguing that “[t]o the extent that
globalized society must choose, it should systematically favor the environment
over jobs and even culture”); WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT
(1997) (arguing that global capitalism is reproducing the “terrible exploitations” of the industrial era). For a scathing review of One World, see John O.
McGinnis, Keynesian Capers, NAT’L REV., May 5, 1997, at 54 (“[Greider’s] solution to economic dislocation is to take every social theory that has failed at the
level of the nation-state and globalize it.”).
2. MUELLER, supra note 1, at 267.
3. See John O. McGinnis, The Origins of Conservatism, NAT’L REV., Dec.
22, 1997, at 32 (“Because of innate reciprocal altruism, exchange is thus as
natural to man as song is to a songbird.”).
4. For example, if Jones has one hundred apples and Smith one hundred
oranges, by hypothesis, the value of an additional apple to Jones is worth less
than the value of an additional apple to Smith. If Smith and Jones agree to
exchange an apple for an orange, therefore, both are better off despite the
absence of any raw production. Jones will continue to trade with Smith until
the marginal value of additional oranges to Jones is no more than the marginal value of additional apples.
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what others demand.5 Moreover, if individuals compete with
one another to supply a particular set of goods, each gains an
incentive to produce the product as efficiently as possible and to
sell the product as cheaply as possible.6 The consumer ultimately votes for the winner of this contest with his pocketbook.7
Moreover, because humans function as group animals and exchange goods and services with one another rather than attempting to gather all life-sustaining materials individually,
individuals are afforded the opportunity to specialize in “producing” certain goods, and then trading those goods for other
necessary goods for which that individual may lack a comparative advantage. This is the insight at the heart of David Ricardo’s principle of comparative advantage8 and Adam Smith’s
theory of division of labor.9 Put simply, two individuals will
both gain by trade by producing the goods for which each has a
comparative advantage. Smith has a comparative advantage
over Jones in producing a good (X) if Smith’s cost of producing X
relative to the cost of producing other goods is lower than Jones’
5. John O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism,
CHI. J. INT’L L. 381, 382 (2000). Professor McGinnis also notes, however, that
humans also have innate tendencies toward gaining wealth through organized
hierarchy, which facilitates outright expropriation to the benefit of those
higher in the “pecking order.” Id. McGinnis views this as a fundamental
argument for constitutional structures — both on the national and international level — that maximize opportunities for exchange and constrain hierarchy.
6. This insight, of course, is far from new or original. See GRADY MILLER,
THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1 (1996) (“[T]he
extensive networks and practices of export trading were probably more firmly
established as a concept two millennia ago than they are today. In fact, many
of the trading and legal traditions in use today were perfected in a far earlier
age.”).
7. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 461 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937). Smith notes:
In every country it always is and must be the interest of the great
body of the people to buy whatever they want of those who sell it
cheapest. The proposition is so very manifest, that it seems ridiculous to take any pains to prove it; nor could it ever have been called in
question, had not the interested sophistry of merchants and manufacturers confounded the common sense of mankind.
Id.
8. See generally DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES
(J.M. Dent & Sons 1965).
9. See generally SMITH, supra note 7, at 7–16.

AND TAXATION
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POLITICAL ECONOMY
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cost of producing X relative to Jones’ cost of producing other
goods.10 Or, by way of example, suppose that Smith can produce
both more apples and more oranges than can Jones — say
Smith can produce either 20 apples or 40 oranges, while Jones
can produce, at most, either 10 apples or 10 oranges. Smith
enjoys a comparative advantage, relative to Jones, only in the
production of oranges; Jones enjoys a comparative advantage
over Smith in the production of apples. The reason is that each
orange produced by Smith costs him ½ an apple, while each orange costs Jones one full apple. But each apple produced by
Smith costs him two oranges, while each apple produced by
Jones costs him only one orange.
Accordingly, even though one individual may be superior to
another in producing all goods, both individuals will nevertheless improve their lot by producing only the goods for which
each enjoys a comparative advantage, and then trading with
one another.11

10. DAVID FRIEDMAN, HIDDEN ORDER 69 (1996). Friedman notes:
The error of confusing absolute advantage (“He can do everything better than I can”) with comparative advantage typically shows up in the
claim that because some other country has lower wages, higher productivity, lower taxes, or some other advantage, it can undersell our
domestic manufacturers on everything, putting our producers and
workers out of work. This is used as an argument for protective tariffs — taxes on imports designed to keep them from competing with
domestically produced goods.
....
Here, as in many other cases, thinking in terms of money obscures
what is really happening. Trade is ultimately goods for goods -—
although that may be less obvious when several countries are involved, since the Japanese can use the dollars they get from us to buy
goods from the Germans, who in turn send the dollars back to get
goods from us. If we measure costs in goods, the Japanese cannot be
better at producing everything. If it costs them fewer computers to
produce a car (translation: If the cost in Japan of all the inputs used
to produce a car divided by the cost in Japan of all the inputs used to
produce a computer is smaller than the corresponding ratio in the
United States), then it costs them more cars to produce a computer.
If they trade their cars for our computers, both sides benefit.
Id. (emphasis in original)
11. The gains from trade are not limited to wealth creation. As John Stuart Mill noted:
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If these principles are valid with respect to individuals, then
they are valid with respect to individual nations.12 But just as
individual trade may make certain individuals worse off in the
short term, so too may international trade. In the primitive
example above, where individuals acquire goods in exchange for
producing a good or providing a service that others desire, supply may exceed demand. The specter of competition, which on
the one hand creates incentive for each producer to produce efficiently and to sell his goods cheaply, may also result in at least
some producers no longer being able to find consumers interested in those producers’ goods. Were this not the case, no incentive would exist to be efficient, and the driving force of free
trade would be undermined.
In the context of international trade, therefore, uniform free
trade will not necessarily make everyone within a nation better
off — at least not in the short term. In any industry where the
comparative advantage for a particular product lies abroad, it
will become cheaper to import the goods than to pay for domestic production. Consequently, the same goods are passed on to

[T]he economical advantages of commerce are surpassed in importance by those of its effects which are intellectual and moral. It is
hardly possible to overrate the value, in the present low state of human improvement, of placing human beings in contact with persons
dissimilar to themselves, and with modes of thought and action
unlike those with which they are familiar.
JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 581 (1909).
12. For a plethora of formalistic economic arguments analyzing free trade
on the international level, see PETER H. LINDERT & CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 17–110 (7th ed. 1982) [hereinafter LINDERT &
KINDLEBERGER]; THEORY, POLICY, AND DYNAMICS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 75–
130 (Wilfred J. Ethier et al. eds., 1993). But cf. Charles K. Rowley, The International Economy In Public Choice Perspective, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO
PUBLIC CHOICE 645, 645–46 (2001) [hereinafter Rowley, The International
Economy]. Rowley notes:
Issues of international trade commonly are framed in terms of nations and not of individuals….Yet, this use of language, while undoubtedly economical, has some problematic features. In reality, individuals trade, not nations, a fact of considerable importance for understanding international economic relations, yet one that is widely
ignored. Models that construe trade as between nations and not as
between individuals stem from notions of economic nationalism that
characterized the mercantilist era.
Id.
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consumers more cheaply than would have been possible before.
However, domestic producers must accordingly lower the resale
price of their product to compete with the foreign imports. Consumers win, but domestic producers in this particular industry
are, from their own vantage point, worse off than they were before13 — at least in the short term.14
B. The Problem of Interest Groups
Although the gains from trade in the aggregate far outweigh
the costs, the benefits are diffuse: an influx of foreign imports in
a particular industry will afford a potentially broad base of consumers the opportunity to buy the industry’s goods at a relatively cheaper price. The cost of these imports, by contrast, is
heavily concentrated: domestic producers may see profit margins reduced, jobs cut, or their doors closed entirely. Moreover,
individuals specialize in production, not consumption.15 Producers in industries adversely affected by free trade16 will accord13. See John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 522 (2000) (“Workers often cannot change industries easily because they have nontransferable skills. Owners’ capital,
moreover, may not be mobile because the owners have invested it in industryspecific assets. As a result, workers and owners in industries that lack a comparative advantage stand to lose a significant portion of their income.”).
14. But cf. id. at 522 (“[F]ree trade may make many of these workers and
owners better off, as open borders create higher-paying jobs and higher returns to capital.”).
15. LINDERT & KINDLEBERGER, supra note 12, at 227. The authors provide
the following example to illustrate the importance of production to an individual over his consumption:
If an import barrier would raise the price of all automobiles by ten
percent, an auto worker would know which side of his bread has more
butter. The barrier brings a 10 percent markup in the product from
which he derives all of his earnings. To be sure, it also means that a
car would cost him 10 percent more, but the cost of owning a car is
only, say, 6 percent of his yearly expenses….So the import barrier
would only raise his cost of living by .10 x .06 = 0.6 percent, while giving him a share of an auto-industry pie that is 10 percent larger. For
an auto consumer not employed in the auto industry, the barrier
simply means a 0.6 percent loss in real income.
Id.
16. This Article repeatedly discusses the benefits of, and from the perspective of particular groups, the costs of, “free trade.” In reality, of course, there
is no choice between unrestricted free trade and total protectionism; rather, in
the context of political markets, the choice will invariably concern erecting
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ingly try to persuade the government to erect protectionist barriers to trade in furtherance of their own self-interest.17 If the
costs of mobilization are not prohibitive, these domestic producers will invest the resources necessary to lobby for a tariff that
will bestow benefits to these groups in excess of the costs necessary to effectively endorse the legislation.18 Put another way:
interest groups that face organization costs of less than one dollar in order to gain one dollar of benefits from trade regulations
will be effective demanders of those regulations.19
By contrast, the individuals that stand to gain from free trade
in any given industry will find that the costs of mobilization
often outweigh the benefits of free trade — i.e., the benefits that
flow from foreign imports. In other words, the benefits to a particular individual of a cheaper product will almost certainly be
outweighed by the costs any one person must incur to fight a
protectionist measure20 — flying to Washington to meet with a
some protectionist barrier or removing one. For simplicity’s sake, however,
when this Article describes how “free trade” might impact a particular industry, and the incentives such an impact generates, it is meant to refer to relaxing whatever protectionist measures might already exist in that particular
industry (or refusing to erect new ones).
17. See, e.g., ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE & ROBERT E. LITAN, SAVING FREE TRADE:
A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 23–24 (1986) (arguing that when faced with competitive threats, interest groups will invariably pressure the legislature to pass
protectionist measures).
18. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and
Theft, 5 WESTERN ECON. J. 224, 228 (1967) [hereinafter Tullock, The Welfare
Costs of Tariffs] (“One would anticipate that the domestic producers would
invest resources in lobbying for the tariff until the marginal return on the last
dollar so spent was equal to its likely return producing the transfer.”).
19. PETER MOSER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GATT 19 (1990). Robert
B. Ekelund, Jr. & Robert D. Tollison, The Interest-Group Theory of Government, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PUBLIC CHOICE 357 (2001).
The interest group theory of government seeks to explain governmental behavior on the basis of the costs of organizing interest groups in
order to seek wealth transfers through the aegis of the state (or, what
is analytically the same thing, the costs of organizing interest groups
to resist governmental expropriation of wealth).
Id.
20. See LINDERT & KINDLEBERGER, supra note 12, at 228.
The costs of getting organized are usually greater for large and diffused groups than for smaller concentrated groups. As anybody
knows who has tried to gather support among many people with individually small stakes in an issue, there can be acute problems both in
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Congressman, drumming up support, or even taking the time to
write a letter of protest, notwithstanding the fact that such
measures, in isolation, are unlikely to have any effect in the
first place.21
reaching them and in getting them to commit effort to the common
cause….By contrast, more concentrated groups find it easier to get
together and contribute to a common lobbying effort. Each member,
being a sizable part of the group’s total membership and resources,
knows that his participation does indeed make a difference….
Id. (emphasis in original) See also McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at
523–24. McGinnis notes:
As concentrated groups, workers and owners can obtain substantial
benefits from government action. Consequently, these groups have
strong incentives to provide campaign contributions and electoral
support in return for protectionist policies. In contrast, groups that
benefit from free trade, such as consumers, are diffuse, and their
gains, though large in the aggregate, tend to be small on an individual basis. These groups have comparatively few incentives to contribute time and money to lobby for free trade policies. Moreover, they
face high agency costs in monitoring legislators to determine whether
their representatives are yielding to interest groups at the expense of
society as a whole.
Id. (citing to MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 145 (1965)).
21. A recent example of this principle in action that made national headlines is the furor surrounding President Bush’s decision to impose tariffs on
steel imports. See James Cox, Bush Slaps Tariffs on Steel Imports, USA
TODAY, Mar. 6, 2002, at B1. The picture accompanying the article captures an
impassioned group of protestors outside the White House in Washington,
D.C., holding a sign that reads: “You don’t have to blow up a blast furnace to
destroy a steel mill; illegal foreign imports are doing the job.” These steel
workers, as noted above, have a strong incentive to mobilize and invest the
resources necessary to campaign for protective barriers.
To its credit, Cox’s article actually recognizes the direct effect of imposing the tariff in a subheadline: “Consumers will pay more…,” and later identifies the costs of tariff imposition to include, in addition to increased consumer
prices, lost jobs for manufacturers that purchase steel (who will now find its
operating costs increased after steel prices rise), political retaliation, and undermining the Bush administration’s “free-trade message.” Id. Not surprisingly, however, there were no reports of individual consumers outside the
White House that day protesting against tariffs. But see James Cox, Steel
Tariff Ruling Tests Bush, USA TODAY, Nov. 11, 2003, at A1 (noting that a
WTO appellate panel “upheld an earlier ruling that Bush violated trade rules
in March 2002 with three-year tariffs on imported steel”). See also Paul
Wiseman & James Cox, Competing Interests Tangle Textile Policy: Bush
Pledged to Help Pakistan, but U.S. Industry Fought Plan, USA TODAY, Apr. 2,
2002, at B1 (noting that President Bush handed Pakistan only one-third of the
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Accordingly, the potential winners of free trade, who are the
victims of protectionist policies, nonetheless lack incentive to
engage in individual lobbying efforts because the costs are prohibitive relative to the diffused costs of a particular protectionist measure (or diffused gains from the lack thereof).22 In the
trade concessions Pakistan had requested in the wake of a post-September
11th economic slump after U.S. textile producers vehemently protested granting any relief to Pakistani imports).
At base, however, the request for “protection” is nothing more or less
than a request for a transfer of wealth. Cf. Tullock, supra note 18, at 226 and
accompanying text (noting that the social costs of tariffs far exceed a mere
transfer of wealth, and that the costs of tariffs are equivalent to a government
mandate that an industry run itself inefficiently). The cries of steel employees
to erect protectionist tariffs may effectively be translated as: We want an extremely large group of people to each pay a small amount of money (the increase in the price of goods) to us. See also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE
AND UTOPIA 272 (1974) (“The illegitimate use of a state by economic interests
for their own ends is based upon a preexisting illegitimate power of the state
to enrich some persons at the expense of others.”).
In fairness, lobbyists and interest groups are not necessarily willful
“rent seekers.” See generally Daniel Klein, If Government Is So Villainous,
How Come Government Officials Don’t Seem Like Villians?, 10 ECON. & PHIL.
91 (1994) (“In most cases, people do not perceive themselves to be rent seekers….”); Gordon Tullock, Future Directions for Rent-Seeking Research, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING 477 (Charles K. Rowley et al. eds.,
1988) (“The student who did not understand the arguments against protective
tariffs, and who is later hired as a lobbyist by the cotton textile industry,
probably operates with a good conscience when he retains false economic arguments.”).
22. See Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the
United States with Implications for International Trade in Europe, 26 GEO.
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 539, 541 (1993) [hereinafter McGee, Protectionism
in the United States]. As Professor McGee notes:
[S]pecial interests — auto manufacturers, steel companies, the textile
industry, and others — have much to gain by enlisting the aid of government to protect them from foreign competition. On the other
hand, the large majority of the population, comprised of unorganized
consumers, has little to lose by any particular protectionist legislation, and may not even know that the measure is costing it money in
the form of higher prices.
Id. McGee proceeds to quote Vilfredo Pareto to succinctly sum up the state of
affairs: “A protectionist measure provides large benefits to a small number of
people, and causes a very great number of consumers a slight loss. This circumstance makes it easier to put a protectionist measure into practice.” Id.
(quoting VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 379 (Ann S.
Schwier & Alfred N. Page eds., Ann. S. Schwier trans., Augustus M. Kelley
Publishers 1971) (1927)).
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aggregate, however, the social costs of protectionism are enormous.
While it cannot be denied that a free flow of foreign imports
may result in a loss of domestic jobs in the particular industry
in question, and that erecting protectionist barriers therefore
“saves jobs” to an extent in that industry,23 the net effect of protectionism may well be to reduce the total number of jobs.24
23. This threat of competition is, of course, the primary reason why the
groups that face a competitive threat from free trade would be acting in their
self-interest to expend resources in an attempt to erect protective barriers.
See supra Part I.A.
24. Empirical data suggests that “[t]he argument that imports cause a
decline in net employment is not only wrong; it is the exact opposite of the
truth.” Dan Griswold, Trade, Jobs, and Manufacturing: Why (Almost All)
U.S. Workers Should Welcome Imports, TRADE BRIEFING PAPER No. 6, Cato
Center for Trade Pol’y Stud., Sep. 30, 1999 at 2, available at http://www.
freetrade.org/pubs/briefs/tbp-006.pdf. Griswold notes that the statistical correlation between job growth and import volume has been a “strong .89.” Id. at
3 (citing to the Economic Report of the President 1999, Bureau of Labor Statistics).
See also ARTHUR T. DENZAU, HOW IMPORT RESTRAINTS REDUCE
EMPLOYMENT 2 (Center for the Study of Am. Business Pub. No. 80, 1987) (noting that the voluntary restraint agreement placed on steel in 1984 increased
employment by 16,900 jobs in the steel industry, but destroyed 52,400 jobs in
industries that use steel); McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at 525.
McGinnis notes:
The trade restrictions secured by protectionist interest groups are
particularly deleterious to social welfare. It is well established in economic theory that the most effective way to increase the income of
disadvantaged groups is through direct transfer payments. For instance, direct transfer payments are preferable to rent control as a
method of improving housing for the poor because direct transfers
lack the substantial deadweight loss that accompanies rent control.
Instead, it is better to provide the poor with housing vouchers. Similarly, with the wealth generated by free trade, society can provide
transfers to people with less income, including those for whom trade
provides no advantage or even a net disadvantage. For example, instead of pressuring the Japanese automobile industry to adopt voluntary export restraints in the 1980s, the United States could have paid
cash compensation to American autoworkers. This strategy would
have cost far less than the $3 billion that American consumers ultimately spent in higher car prices.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Barbara Hagenbaugh, Steel Tariffs Catch
Some in Middle, USA TODAY, July 24, 2002, at B1 (noting that the imposition
of tariffs on steel imports has caused many “mom-and-pop” manufacturers,
who “use steel to make goods that go into everything from cars to ovens to
batteries,” to worry that they will have to close their doors).
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Moreover, in any situation where a particular industry is protected from more efficient competitors25 through government
legislation, the government may be said to be subsidizing inefficiency.26 It makes little sense to “force consumers to spend an
extra $160,000 a year in the form of higher prices to protect a
job in the auto industry that pays roughly $30,000 or $40,000 a
year.”27
25. This point assumes the competition is “more efficient” because the
same product is offered for lower prices than the domestic competition. Were
this not the case, domestic producers would not face a competitive threat.
26. See McGee, Protectionism in the United States, supra note 22, at 545.
Professor McGee also cites to studies illustrating that trade restrictions raise
the cost of imported goods in the United States by 20% on average, and raise
the price of comparable, domestically produced goods by 10% to 14%. Id. at
553 (citing Alan Murray, A Free-Trade Bastion, U.S. Isn’t Half as Pure as
Many People Think, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1985, at A1. McGee continues:
Trade restrictions on automobiles, clothing, and sugar cost U.S. consumers $14 billion in 1984, which amounted to a 23% income tax surcharge for families with incomes under $10,000, but translated into
only a 3% surcharge for families with incomes over $60,000. Protectionism in the textile industry alone has been estimated to cost poor
families almost 9% of their disposable income. Another study found
that textile quotas cost the poorest fifth of the U.S. population 3.6% of
their income, but resulted in a 0.3% increase in income for the top
fifth.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Rowley, The International Economy, supra
note 12, at 665–66 (noting a study by Hufbauer and Elliot in which the potential gains to consumers from removing all tariff and quantitative restrictions
for the year 1990 alone were calculated to be $70 billion). Cf. Paul Wiseman,
China’s Low-Cost Labor Lures More Japanese Companies, USA TODAY, Nov.
21, 2002, at B1 (noting the Japanese fear of cheap Chinese labor, but observing that now “with gusto, Japanese executives are descending on Chinese
boomtowns…spending their nights crooning into the karaoke machines of
local bars and their days scouring the industrial landscape for factories they
can do business with.”).
27. McGee, Protectionism in the United States, supra note 22, at 545. See
Rowley, The International Economy, supra note 12, at 645, 668. Rowley notes:
It is often argued that trade protection preserves jobs in the United
States (the so-called ‘Perot effect’). If so, the cost to consumers of preserving such jobs is extremely high. In a quarter of the 21 sectors
scrutinized by Hufbauer and Elliot (1994), the cost per job saved was
in excess of $500,000 per annum even ignoring rent-seeking
costs…Thus, consumers expended more than six times the average
annual compensation of manufacturing workers to preserve jobs
through import restraints, even ignoring rent-seeking costs. Once
rent-seeking costs are accounted for, consumers expended more than
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A detour through formal economic theory will illustrate this
point more explicitly. Figure 128 shows a commodity that can be
produced domestically at the cost of P1 and imported at P0.
With a given demand and no tariff, Q0 units will be purchased
at a price of P0. If a protectionist tariff is imposed, then Q1 units
will be purchased at a price of P1. Consumers will consequently
be paying a higher price for the commodity then they otherwise
would in the absence of the protectionist tariff, so the increase
in price is a transfer of wealth from some members of the community to others. The corresponding welfare loss — a transfer
more than outright loss to the economy — is represented by the
shaded triangle.

ten times the average wage earned by a worker in such a protected
job.
Id. See also James P. Miller, Steel Tariffs Paint Bush into Corner, CHI. TRIB.,
Sep. 19, 2003, at 3–1 (noting that “[e]ver since the tariffs were put into effect…U.S. makers of everything from barbecue grills to auto parts and bulldozers have complained loudly that the tariffs have disrupted steel supplies,
raised their costs and made it harder than ever to compete with offshore competitors.”).
For an argument based entirely on first principles against any such
redistributive scheme, see NOZICK, supra note 21, at 272 (“The illegitimate use
of a state by economic interests for their own ends is based upon a preexisting
illegitimate power of the state to enrich some persons at the expense of others.”); Rowley, The International Economy, supra note 12, at 668. Rowley
notes:
Although the large majority of economists view the issue of free trade
versus protection exclusively in utilitarian terms, the issue should
also be viewed from a rights-based perspective. Free trade follows as
an inevitable implication for any individual who endorses the philosophy of John Locke as it does for any individual who endorses
Jasay’s principles of first, avoid doing harm and when in doubt, abstain.
Protection violates the economic freedom of those who wish to engage
in trade, encroaching as it does upon their property and contract
rights. Any government that imposes trade restraints in the absence
of the unanimous consent of those who are thus coerced commits a
tort and should be exposed to potential civil suits to compensate those
who suffer harm.
Id. (emphasis in original).
28. The graph in Figure 1 appeared in Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, supra note 18, at 225 fig. 1.
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Price

Figure 1

P1

P0

Quantity
Q1

Q0

There are, however, a number of significant costs ignored by
this analysis. The actual effects of the tariff would be much
more far-reaching. Because the domestic producers are now
engaged in producing a commodity that, absent the protectionist tariff, could be produced and imported more cheaply, resources are being inefficiently utilized. As Gordon Tullock has
pointed out, the situation is therefore indistinguishable from
any situation in which the government forced a domestic industry to abandon an efficient method of production and adopt an
inefficient one.29 Thus, the real welfare loss incurred by the tariff would not just be the wealth transfer represented by the
shaded triangle in Figure 1, but rather the entire area to the
left of the triangle (bounded vertically on both sides by P1 and
P0). In other words, “a tariff shifting production from the production of export goods to import-replacement goods where the
country has a comparative disadvantage is, in fact, a governmental requirement that the goods be obtained in an inefficient
manner....”30 Accordingly, the cost of a protectionist tariff is the
shaded triangle “plus the difference between domestic cost of

29. Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, supra note 18, at 226.
30. Id.
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production and the price at which the goods could be purchased
abroad,”31 represented here in Figure 2.
Price

Figure 2

P1

P0

Quantity
Q1

Q0

Moreover, as discussed above,32 governments do not simply
impose protectionist tariffs unilaterally. Domestic producers
will expend resources to hire interest groups to engage in political lobbying, and foreign exports will likely expend resources
attempting to counteract the effects of domestic special interest
lobbying. These expenditures, which may ultimately offset each
other in part, are pure waste in terms of social wealth.33 They
are spent, not increasing wealth, but in attempts to transfer or
resist the transfer of wealth.34 The opportunity costs of failing
31. Id.
32. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
33. See Charles K. Rowley & Robert D. Tollison, Rent-Seeking and Trade
Protection, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING 222 (1988) [hereinafter Rowley & Tollison, Rent-Seeking] (“Clearly, societies characterized by
widespread monopoly and dissipative rent-seeking will, ceteris paribus, be
significantly less wealthy than those that are not.”).
34. See Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, supra note 18, at 225; Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Production of Legitimate
and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1144 (1997) (“Special
interest legislation is undesireable because economic actors expend vast
amounts of resources to obtain rent-seeking legislation, to comply with it…, to
avoid having to comply with it,…and to prevent it from being enacted in the
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to invest these same resources elsewhere in the economy (where
they might actually create wealth) therefore imposes additional
societal costs.35
The effects of special-interest lobbying become clearer by examining the “supply side” of public legislation, i.e., the incentive
structure of politicians and bureaucrats. What might be
deemed the “high school civics”36 conception of the relationship
between legislators and their constituents is one of agency. We
expect that our legislators will act on our behalf, and, in questions of policy, will consult our interests and behave accordingly.37 But in fact, this model of the legislator-constituent relationship paints a far rosier picture than reality will bear.
“Economics treats the individual actor as the fundamental
unit of analysis,”38 and derives its predictive power based on a
fundamental conception of human nature.39 In ordinary markets, the individual actor is
first place.”). See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1965).
35. And not least of all, any tariff involves expenditure on administrative
costs necessary to maintain the tariff — for example, “customs inspectors…who do the actual collection and coast guards who prevent smuggling.”
Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, supra note 18, at 225.
36. The “high school civics” label was borrowed from Donald J. Boudreaux,
Review Essay, Was Your High School Civics Teacher Right After All?, 1 INDEP.
REV. 111 (1996).
37. See Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really “Legislative Bargains”?
The Failure of the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1145, 1175 (1998). Nevertheless, the author concedes that the issue of
whether a legislator should consult the interests of his constituents and behave accordingly on issues of policy has been the source of a “longstanding
debate on the nature of political representation.” Id. at n.186.
38. William F. Shughar II & Laura Razzolini, Introduction: Public choice
in the millenium, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PUBLIC CHOICE xxii (William F.
Shughart II & Laura Razzolini eds., 2001) [hereinafter Shughart & Razzolini,
Introduction].
39. See, e.g., JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT 18 (1962). The authors stress the focus on the individual actor in
economic theory by emphasizing that:
[E]conomic theory does not try to explain all human behavior, even
all of that which might be called ‘economic’ in some normally accepted
sense of this term. At best, the theory explains only one important
part of human activity in this sphere….No economist, to our knowledge, has ever denied that exchange takes place which is not “economic”….The theory requires for its usefulness only the existence of
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a person who, as a consumer, strives to maximize his own
sense of well-being, given the constraints imposed by a limited
budget and the prices of available goods, who, as a worker,
strives to maximize his income, given his native talents, the
skills he has acquired, and his tastes for work and leisure, and
who, as a business owner, strives to maximize his profits,
given the constraints imposed by technology, by the costs of
inputs and the tastes and preferences of buyers. No matter
what role he plays, however, the individual actor is assumed
to be guided largely by self-interest.40

The central tenet of public choice theory41 is the emphasis of
the methodological individualism of economic analysis (traditionally reserved for the study of market actors) in the study of
politics and political actors.42 Once the rational actor model is
applied to the realm of politics, several insights become immediately obvious. Public choice rejects the construction of vague,
ambiguous collective units, such as “society,” the “people,” or
the “national interest.”43 Actors in the public sector have the
same self-interested incentives as market actors; the “public
interest,” however defined, is no longer the guiding light of po-

the economic relation to a degree sufficient to make prediction and
explanation possible.
Even if the economic forces are not predominant enough in human
behavior to allow predictions to be made, the formal theory remains
of some value in explaining one aspect of that behavior and in allowing the theorist to develop hypotheses that may be subjected to conceptual, if not actual, testing. Reduced to its barest essentials, the
economic assumption is simply that the representative or the average
individual, when confronted with real choice in exchange, will choose
‘more’ rather than less.
Id. (emphasis in original).
40. Shughart & Razzolini, Introduction, supra note 38, at xxii.
41. See generally id.
42. See Shughart & Razzolini, Introduction, supra note 38, at xxii.
While for model-building purposes ‘self-interest’ is frequently construed narrowly to mean wealth maximization, the rational actor
model is in fact much more general. Economists assume that individuals pursue the maximization of utility, of which money wealth is
only one component, thereby allowing for the fact that human action
is guided by a variety of goals and objectives….
Id.
43. Id.
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litical behavior.44 Elected officials will strive for reelection, and
appointed officials will strive to secure larger agency budgets
and to advance their careers.45 If a political actor supports legislation at the behest of particular interest groups, he will be rewarded by these groups with increased campaign contributions
or promises of large blocs of votes.46 Policy proposals will there44. Lest it be said that these tenets of public choice theory paint an unduly
pessimistic view of human nature (as is asserted in Steven Kelman Public
Choice and Public Spirit, 87 PUBLIC CHOICE 80, 80–94 (1987)), it should be
noted that:
[P]ublic choice no more denies the existence of ‘public spirit’ than
economics denies the existence of altruism. Specialists in neither
field have ever argued that self-interest is the only motivator of human action. Rather, the shared assumption of economics and public
choice is that self-interest is the most important of the many and varied forces that animate the behavior of complex individuals.
Shughart & Razzolini, Introduction, supra note 38, at xxvi (emphasis in original). The basis of this assumption, therefore, is not a cynical view of human
nature, but the recognition of “repeated empirical testing showing that models
based on self-interest do a better job of explaining observed behavior than
models based on alternative behavioral assumptions.” Id. On a similar note,
commentators have also advanced the following explanation for the utility of
adopting such as assumption:
Compared with the more standard works in political science, our
analysis may seem to involve a “pessimistic” view of human nature.
For scientific progress, however, it is essential that all conceivable
assumptions about human behavior be tested. If our models provide
some explanations of real-world events, and we believe that they do,
our assumptions must have some empirical validity, quiet apart from
the “attractiveness” of the human characters that inhabit our hypothetical model world.
BUCHANAN AND TULLOCK, supra note 39, at 266.
45. Shughart & Razzolini, Introduction, supra note 38, at xxii; LINDERT &
KINDLEBERGER, supra note 12, at 226. Lindert and Kindleberger point out,
however, that the reelection-maximizing assumption need not imply the cynical view of politicians
who will stop at nothing to get reelected and who care only about the
glory, salary, and power that come with retaining office….The incumbents may in fact be motivated primarily by their own loftier vision of the national interest and how they would serve it with some
key steps if reelected.
Id.
46. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at 523 n.59 (“[I]nterest
groups may exercise great leverage over legislators through campaign contributions or independent political expenditures.” (citing Daniel H. Lowenstein,
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fore be evaluated by the extent to which a politician’s odds of
reelection (or personal stature) are enhanced or diminished by
implementing the policy.47
C. High School Civics Fails Again: The True
Nature of Democracy
Thus far this Article has shown that trade is as natural to
humankind as is “song to a songbird,”48 and that free trade allows individuals to reap the benefits of comparative advantage
and specialization of labor.49 It has also demonstrated, however,
that while the benefits of free trade are often diffuse, those adversely affected by competition will bear heavily concentrated
costs.50 Consequently, these groups have a strong incentive to
lobby for protectionist measures to forestall competition. Consumers who might otherwise reap the benefits of open barriers,
by contrast, lack incentive to mobilize in lieu of organization
costs and will therefore not wield any significant degree of influence over political markets relative to organized interest
groups. Political actors, for their part, will act in accordance
with their own self-interest by attempting to implement policies
that benefit interest groups willing to reciprocate with campaign contributions or votes of gratitude at the next election.
The protectionist legislation that will potentially emerge from
this process, however, imposes enormous societal costs in the
aggregate.
None of the foregoing, however, explains why, if political actors are truly self-interested, efforts to promote socially harmful
legislation for the benefit of a privileged few is truly a selfinterested act. After all, if the majority of voters (consumers)

Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. REV.
784, 826–28 (1985))). Cf. Jonathan Weisman, ‘Pork’ Noses Into Non-Profits,
USA TODAY, Apr. 22, 2002, at A1 (noting a trend in which “members of Congress are establishing their own charities, funding them through the House
Appropriations Committee and taking pork-barrel politics to a new level”).
47. See, e.g., LINDERT & KINDLEBERGER, supra note 12, at 227 (“Any incumbent knows that to get reelected he needs to approach each individual issues
asking, ‘How can I maximize the votes and campaign backing of those people
for whom this is the issue that is key to their election sentiments?’”).
48. See McGinnis, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
49. See supra Part I.A.
50. See supra Part I.B.
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will end up paying higher prices for particular products as a
result of protectionist legislation, then surely they will penalize
the politicians who supported the legislation by withholding
their votes in the next election. This, of course, is one of the
central virtues of democracy: well-informed voters replace government officials who fail to serve the public interest with officials who better serve the public interest,51 and therefore “prevent government from being a toady to special-interest
groups.”52 Much the same way that actors in private markets
self-interestedly absorb information and act accordingly, voters
will monitor the politicians they vote into office to ensure that
these politicians do not support harmful interest-group legislation.
This conception of political markets constitutes what might
be deemed the second tenet of high school civics.53 Much like
the first tenet, however, it must be condemned as grossly naïve
and simply not consistent with reality.54 Private-property markets and political markets are fundamentally distinct in that
“there is no such thing as a voiceless private-property market
participant.”55 Every action of a private market participant
51. For a recent and highly sophisticated exposition of this view, see
DONALD WITTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE 5 (1995).
52. Boudreaux, supra note 36, at 115 (criticizing Wittman).
53. The “first tenet” of high school civics was discussed above at supra
Section I.B (arguing that politicians do not scrutinize laws by the extent to
which they benefit the public, but rather by the extent to which supporting
such laws will earn the favor of interest groups who can increase the politician’s odds of re-election).
54. See Rowley & Tollison, Rent-Seeking, supra note 33, at 224. The authors note:
[The standard] theory concludes that once governments are informed
of the clear net benefits of unilateral trade liberalization, they will do
away with trade protection, compensating losers, if necessary, via a
non-distortionary tax/subsidy intervention. Much of the international trade literature seems to be dedicated to this process of information transmission. However, governments patently do not respond
as the pure theory predicts they will. Public choice explains theoretically why governments accept generalized wealth destruction by
maintaining and even extending trade protection policy even in a
well-informed political market.
Id.
55. See Boudreaux, supra note 36, at 116. A simple example may be used
to drive home this distinction:
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conveys information about the value a participant places on a
particular product. In the aggregate, this information combines
to create the pattern of prices existing at any moment. Moreover, because every individual who participates in a private
market will bear the cost of his actions, or reap the benefits
thereof, private market participants have a strong incentive to
purchase information and use it to guide their decision-making.
Political markets, by contrast, possess neither of these characteristics. Even if voters are well-informed,56 the sheer volume
of issues on the table during any particular election precludes
registering approval or disapproval for any individual issue. As
Boudreaux puts the point,
[i]ssues from abortion to school choice to government provision
of medical services to farm subsidies to child-welfare policies
to tax rates to…you name it, government has some potential
say over them. Literally tens of thousands of issues are at
stake in every national election (with almost as many issues at
stake in state elections). And yet, each voter during each sixyear span has a maximum of nine ballots to cast in four national elections. During any six-year period…each voter is allowed to vote twice for a president/vice-president team, four
times for a U.S. Representative, and a maximum of three
times for a U.S. senator…[These] are the only windows of opportunity for American voters to speak politically on national
issues.57

Accordingly, the claim that voters will register disapproval of
attempts to pass harmful interest-group legislation with their
votes is naively optimistic. A voter cognizant of his Congressman’s support for various protectionist legislative proposals
may decide that the politician’s positions on abortion, campaign

Every time we buy or sell something — or refuse to buy or sell something — we communicate with property owners around the world by
adding our “voice” to the market. If you purchase a new Honda Accord today, you reveal to the market that you value such a car by at
least the price you pay for it. If you sell some labor services today,
you reveal to the world that you will perform such services for a wage
at or above the amount your employer pays you.
Id.
56. For a discussion of the incentives of voters to acquire and digest political information, see infra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
57. See Boudreaux, supra note 36, at 117.
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finance reform, or the environment take precedence over harmful protectionist legislation.58 Put simply, commercial policy is
not formed by direct public referenda.59
Moreover, the second tenet of high school civics posits that
voters have a rational incentive to acquire and digest political
information. This incentive is presumably a corollary of the
view that voters recognize their duty to operate as a check on
(costly) self-interested political behavior. In practice, the excessive level of noise in political elections precludes registering approval or disapproval of specific attempts to pass harmful interest-group legislation. What is more, on balance, citizens have a
strong disincentive to pay the cost of acquiring and digesting
political information. Thus, not only are voters precluded in
practice from checking harmful political behavior because of
excessive political noise; voters are ill-equipped to identify interest-group legislation in the first place.
If the average voter watches the evening news or occasionally
skims a newspaper, she may know if a particular candidate is a
Democrat or a Republican, and that between two candidates of
each major political party, one is more likely to be further “to
the right” than the other.60 This knowledge in itself, however, is
largely useless. For voters to deter opportunistic political behavior they must be informed of specific proposals or attempts
to support specific legislation. In reality, however,
[h]ow many American voters know that the national government subsidizes sugar farmers and peanut farmers? How
many Americans understand the consequences of deficit financing? How many can distinguish the government’s budget
deficit from the so-called trade deficit? Indeed, how many vot58. See Boudreaux, supra note 36, at 118 (further noting that “[i]nterest
groups can obtain a great deal of pork if such pork is bundled with other government programs and policy issues”).
59. See LINDERT & KINDLEBERGER, supra note 12, at 225. The authors continue: “Voters are not given the chance to go to the polls and vote for and
against, say, ‘Proposition P: The import duty on motorcycles shall be raised
from 5 percent to 10 percent ad valorem: Yes…No.’” Id. at 225–26. It should
be noted, however, that private markets — including, e.g., markets for residential location — face some of the same bundling problems, albeit to a lesser
extent. When an individual purchases a home, to take one example, many
variables are undoubtedly at play: proximity to family, proximity to grocery
stores, crime rates, local school systems, and so forth.
60. See Boudreaux, supra note 36, at 117.
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ers know most federal regulations can be looked up in the
Code of Federal Regulations — a document of doublecolumned small print that now gobbles up almost twenty feet
of library shelf space? I suspect very few.61

It is highly improbable that the average citizen could possibly
monitor the number of actions taken by incumbents to act as a
sufficient check on socially harmful behavior, or comprehend
the full implications of any proposals championed by other candidates, even if he wanted to. But what is more, not only does
the average citizen have a strong disincentive to pay the cost of
acquiring political information because she is unlikely to understand all of it in the first place; the odds of any citizen’s “research” paying off for that person are infinitesimal. In other
words, if the odds of a single vote changing the result of an election are mathematically zero, and if voting is the one method by
which citizens register their voice in political markets,62 then a
strong disincentive to pay the costs of acquiring information
exists.63 Voters will therefore remain rationally ignorant. By
contrast, since private-market actors must bear the full costs —
or reap the full benefits — of their actions, a strong incentive
exists to acquire information. Accordingly, the analogy between
private and political markets simply cannot be maintained.
The “problem of interest groups” lives.

61. Boudreaux, supra note 36, at 122.
62. My assumption here that the average voter may “express his voice”
only in elections follows from the previous discussion of the costs of mobilization as prohibitive, supra Part I.B.
63. These same premises also lead to the conclusion that individual citizens may choose not to vote at all. See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, Current
Population Survey: Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2000
(Feb. 2002) (noting that nineteen million registered voters did not cast ballots
in the 2000 presidential election, and that of the nineteen million non-voters
20.9% of voters reasoned they were “too busy,” 14.8% refrained from voting
because of “illness,” and 12.2% were “not interested”), available at http://www.
census.gov/prod/2002 pubs/pb20-542.pdf. See GORDON TULLOCK, ON VOTING
(1998), for more formalistic arguments concerning the nature of voting behavior.
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II. THE SOLUTION
A. Leading By Example: The United States Constitution as a
Model for International Federalism
In the context of international trade,64 the principal task of
trade institutions like the WTO should be to “restrain protectionist interest groups and thereby promote both free trade and
representative democracy.”65 The American political structure,
through the United States Constitution, offers compelling instruction on how institutions can simultaneously promote free
trade and democratic governance.66
Much the same way that interest groups lobby for protectionist tariffs at the federal level, such groups may attempt to lobby
for entry barriers at the state level. Perhaps the most famous
exposition of the danger of interest groups was set forth by
James Madison in The Federalist No. 10.67 There, Madison recognized that individuals and groups would try to use the power
of government to further their own interests.68 Several institutional mechanisms of the United States Constitution reflect this
concern. For example, the large Republic described in The Fed64. The foregoing discussions of the nature of interest groups and the fallacy of “high school civics” are not, of course, confined to the context of free
trade.
65. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at 536.
66. Id. (“The original Constitution established mechanisms that restrict
protectionist interest groups, and subsequent generations have developed
further structural limitations. These constraints have made representative
democracy more reflective of majority will, improved regulatory efficiency, and
promoted economic growth through trade.”).
67. See The Federalist No. 10, at 45–51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
68. See BUCHANAN AND TULLOCK, supra note 39, at 25 (“[Madison’s] numerous examples of legislation concerning debtor-creditor relations, commercial
policy, and taxation suggest that perhaps a better understanding of Madison’s
own conception of democratic process may be achieved by examining carefully
the implications of the economic approach to human behavior in collective
choice.”); John O. McGinnis, The Origins of Conservatism, NAT’L REV., Dec. 22,
1997, at 34 (“…Madison observed that the greatest problem for any political
structure is how to protect the ‘unequal faculties for acquiring property’ from
government interference.”). McGinnis argues that “Madison recognized the
very inequality that makes this prosperity possible also makes the protection
of the different abilities to acquire property more difficult because it exacerbates the danger that the government will be used as a mechanism for redistribution from one faction to another.” Id.
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eralist No. 10 decreased the power of local factions by “pitting
them against one another in a more extended polity.”69 Generally, bicameralism and the separation of powers both operate to
frustrate interest groups by imposing more powerful barriers to
rent-seeking legislation than simple majoritarian structures.70
Moreover, the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution is employed to strike down state legislation that discriminates against, or unduly burdens, interstate commerce.71 Thus,
the creation of an open national market encourages competition
among the states for the investment of resources.
The WTO fosters an international trade regime that replicates this brand of federalism. In the same way that forcing
state governments to compete for “the capital and skills of a
national citizenry imposes substantial limits on a state government’s ability to expropriate, the emerging free trade regime
performs the same essential function, tempering the enduring
and inevitable avarice of the government and its rulers on a
global scale.”72

69. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at 526–27.
70. Id.
71. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power…To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.”). See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)
for the modern commerce clause test. It should be noted, however, that the
dormant commerce clause power is merely inferred from the affirmative grant
of federal power found in the commerce clause itself. See generally Richard A.
Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4,
17 (1987) (“A number of provisions of the [U.S.] Constitution seem to have an
implicit economic logic. This is perhaps the clearest with respect to the “negative” or “dormant” commerce clause…”).
72. John O. McGinnis, The Symbiosis of Constitutionalism and Technology,
25 HARV. J.L. &.PUB. POL. 3, 9 (2002). McGinnis further argues that:
International federalism is appropriate for our time because individuals still have the attachments to their nation-states to resist
regulatory regimes being imposed by world government. Thus, an international federalism can plausibly be created because the World
Trade Organization and other global economic organizations can police the conditions for regulatory competition among nation-states
while citizens in those nation-states can be counted on to resist the
expansion of regulatory power in international institutions.
Id. at 9–10.
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B. The World Trade Organization
With this background in place, this Article now probes the
WTO’s constitutional structure and illustrates why its internal
provisions and mechanisms enshrine a regime of international
federalism that ultimately promotes economic growth within its
member nations.73
The WTO was established by the Final Act of the Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations in 1994,74 and is responsible for
administering multilateral trade agreements negotiated by its
members.75 Its principal functions may be described as follows:
First, the WTO provides a substantive code of conduct directed
at the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade, and the
elimination of discrimination in international trade relations.
Second, the WTO provides the institutional framework for the
administration of the substantive code. Thus the WTO provides an integrated structure for the administration of both all
past trade agreements and the agreements under the Uruguay
73. It should be noted at the outset that this section offers an account of
global multilateralism, and the WTO in particular, in necessarily broad
strokes. It does not, accordingly, seek to criticize or defend particular treaties
or the present composition of the WTO. Rather, this section confines itself to
illustrating why the nature of an international regime such as the WTO will
tend to reign in the costs of opportunistic rent-seeking by interest groups. For
present purposes, it is sufficient merely to note that politics is a game of compromise: invariably, particular WTO provisions that cause more social harm
than good in the aggregate have hitchhiked along with more economically
sound provisions. So long as these questionable provisions remain the exception, and not the norm, the model illustrated in this section posits that the
WTO will continue to facilitate economically sound policies more often than
not.
74. “Although the Final Act was signed in April 1994, the WTO did not
actually come into existence until the following year.” See McGinnis &
Movsesian, supra note 13, at 530 n.96 (citing David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay
Round Introduction to International Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIZ.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 7 (1995)).
75. The WTO presently has 146 member states. For a list of the WTO’s
membership, see World Trade Organization, The Organization: Members and
Observers, at http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/ whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm
(last visited Nov. 16, 2003). It was created in part because the legal foundations of the GATT were weak (GATT was, and is, a treaty — i.e., it contained
no institutional provisions) and in part because two issues on the agenda of
the Uruguay Round were not covered by GATT: services and intellectual
property rights. BERNARD M. HOEKMAN, TRADE LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS 3
(1995).
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Round of Trade Negotiations. Third, the WTO ensures the
implementation of the substantive code. It provides a forum
for dispute settlement in international trade matters, and
conducts surveillance of national trade policies and practices.
Fourth, the WTO acts as a medium for the conduct of international trade relations amongst member States. Particularly, it
is to act as a forum for the negotiation of further trade liberalization, and improvement in the international trading system.76

The WTO should therefore be regarded as “both an institution
embodying a set of rules and principles concerning the use of
policies that affect trade flows, and as a market in which members exchange market access ‘concessions’ and agree on the
‘rules of the game.’”77 For example, the periodic reductions in
world tariffs provided for by the WTO have been called its “core
feature.”78 Even before the inauguration of the WTO, General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) members met approximately once every ten years in negotiating rounds that
reduced tariffs on goods on a reciprocal basis.79 These rounds
produced dramatic reductions in world tariffs.80 The ratio of the
value of duties collected to the value of imports dropped from
approximately 37% before the adoption of GATT to less than 5%
in the early 1990s.81 The inauguration of the WTO continues
this pattern of reciprocal tariff reductions and expands the
scope of the system through new agreements pertaining to in-

76. JOHN H. JACKSON, ALAN O. SYKES, & ASIF H. QURESHI, THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE NORMS 5 (John H.
Jackson & Alan O. Sykes eds., 1997). Qureshi further notes that “the institutional framework of the WTO can be said to provide a basic, but by no means
complete, constitutional framework for the international trading system. The
system provides for a legislative machinery in the field of international trade,
for a dispute settlement apparatus, a surveillance mechanism, and an administrative structure.” Id. See also Agreement Establishing the Multilateral
Trade Organization, art. III, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13.
77. HOEKMAN, supra note 75, at 4.
78. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at 544.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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tellectual property, services, health and safety measures, and
product standards.82
The theoretical underpinning of this regime of reciprocity is
as follows. Governments (i.e., collectives of individual domestic
political actors) lack incentive to reduce trade barriers unilaterally. Indeed, as discussed,83 politicians will face strong interest
group pressure to erect new protectionist legislation. Under a
multilateral trade agreement that mandates reciprocity, however, domestic export interests stand to reap benefits that
largely offset the specific losses incurred by protected industries. Removing protectionist barriers in a domestic market will
result in increased market access abroad. With foreign markets
for their goods, these domestic export interests will, under a
reciprocity regime, naturally exert pressure on political actors
that will largely counteract the pressure mounted by domestic
producers to maintain protectionist barriers.84 If reciprocity was

82. HOEKMAN, supra note 75, at 4; John H. Jackson & Alan O. Sykes, Introduction and Overview, in IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND 4 (John H.
Jackson & Alan O. Sykes eds., 1997).
83. Supra Parts I.B – I.C and accompanying text.
84. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at 545–46 (noting that the
“WTO system mobilizes the interest groups that stand to win — workers and
owners in industries that will prosper because of free trade — to counterbalance the interest groups that stand to lose”). It should be noted, however, that
tariff reductions alone cannot ensure a free trade regime. Id. As the authors
powerfully indicate:
Protectionist groups can frustrate the effect of tariff reductions by
persuading national governments to impose nontariff barriers. Even
if a member complies with GATT-mandated tariff reductions on a
given product, for example, the member could offset the effect of
these reductions by imposing quotas on the number of imports allowed into the country. Therefore, just as the United States Supreme
Court has developed a doctrine to prevent state nontariff discrimination against out-of-state imports, the WTO has established a series of
rules that prevent members from adopting measures that negate the
value of GATT tariff reductions.
Id. at 546–47. The authors continue by noting, for example, that:
[A]rticle III of GATT prohibits members from imposing special internal taxes on imports — sales taxes, for example — that exceed taxes
on “like domestic products.” Because members might impose discriminatory internal regulations on imports, article III also requires
members to accord imports “treatment no less favorable than that accorded like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regula-
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not mandated by the multilateral trade agreement, however,
there would be no guarantee of market access abroad, and domestic export interests would therefore take little interest in
opposing a protectionist barrier.85
Accordingly, agreements administered by the WTO create
pressure for liberalizing access to markets over time in a way
that is politically more feasible than unilateral action. Indeed,
reciprocal liberalization of market access has been a necessary
(although perhaps not sufficient) condition for the reduction of
barriers.86 Domestic producers may lose from removing protectionist barriers to imports, but domestic exports win — if reciprocity is in effect. 87 But the situation is not a net wash, of
course, because consumers benefit from free trade.88 The selfinterested politician assumed by public choice theory may be
moved to act at the behest of powerful interest groups if the
tions and requirements affecting their internal sale,…purchase,
transportation, distribution or use.”
Id. at 547 (citing to GATT article III). See also Rowley, The International
Economy, supra note 12, at 659. Rowley notes:
Tariff protection now plays a diminished role in international markets, in large part owing to the success of a sequence of multilateral
tariff-reduction rounds since the end of the Second World War. In its
place, protection more frequently takes the form of bilaterally negotiated voluntary export restraints (VERs) negotiated between the governments of importing and exporting nations.
Id. at 660.
85. See LINDERT & KINDLEBERGER, supra note 12, at 231–34 (noting that
when export interests have been organized, policy has tended toward freer
trade). The authors quote John Stuart Mill: “A good cause seldom triumphs
unless someone’s interest is bound up in it.” Id.
86. HOEKMAN, supra note 75, at 4.
87. Rowley, The International Economy, supra note 12, at 659. Rowley
notes:
If a free trade agreement (FTA) must liberalize completely trade
among the partner nations, a particular government might endorse
an agreement in two types of situations. The first is the situation in
which the FTA generates substantial welfare gains for the average
voter and in which the adversely affected interest groups fail to coordinate their efforts to defeat the accord. The second is the situation
in which the agreement creates profit gains for exporters in excess of
the combined losses imposed on import-competing industries and on
the average voter.
Id.
88. See supra Part I.A and accompanying text.
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stakes are high enough. However, if countervailing pressures
offset the interest groups — or if the pressures of one export
group counteract the forces of an import interest group — then,
all things being equal, self-interested politicians should look
with favor upon the consumer benefits of a free trade regime.
For this analysis to hold, however, the average voter is presumed to actually prefer free trade — or at worst, that the average voter remains rationally ignorant. In fact, however, there
is reason to believe that the average voter — the individual
who, as a consumer, will benefit from free trade — is likely to
outright oppose it. If this is true, then politicians faced with
offsetting interest group pressure from import and export industries may not necessarily advance free trade policies by default. Free trade may produce gains in the aggregate, but any
self-interested politician would obviously take notice if the majority of his constituency believed that free trade was an evil.
The following section therefore examines consumer beliefs on
free trade in more detail, and considers the extent to which the
WTO may operate to counteract the potentially harmful effects
of these beliefs, thereby further advancing free trade.
C. The Missing Link: Rational Irrationality
It is often said that the proposition that free trade creates
wealth among nations has been “well established since at least
the beginning of the nineteenth century.”89 This is undoubtedly
true — if it is taken to mean “well-established among economists.” As far as the general public is concerned, however,
quite the opposite is true.
The positive economic beliefs of economists and the public
appear to be systematically inapposite.90 Professor Bryan
Caplan has synthesized data from the Survey of Americans and
Economists on the Economy to directly contrast the views of the
general public and professional economists.91 The results are
89. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at 521.
90. See generally Bryan Caplan, Systematically Biased Beliefs About Economics, 112 ECON. J. 479 (2002) (citing data from the Survey of Americans and
Economists on the Economy 1996) [hereinafter Caplan, Systematically Biased
Beliefs About Economics].
91. Bryan Caplan, Rational Ignorance vs. Rational Irrationality, 54(1)
KYKLOS 3, 21 (2001); Bryan Caplan, The Logic of Collective Belief, 15
RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 218 (2003).
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startling. For example, Question 26 of the Survey of Americans
and Economists on the Economy (1996) (“The Survey”) asked:
“Which do you think is more responsible for the recent increase
in gasoline prices: the normal law of supply and demand, or oil
companies trying to increase profits?” As Caplan notes, “only
22% of the general public accepted the supply-and-demand explanation, compared to 85% of economists, while 73% and 8%
respectively affirmed the second explanation.”92
The Survey further asked both the general public and its
group of professional economists a series of questions on “Why
the Economy Is Not Doing Better Than It Is.” The results appear below in Table 1.93

92. Caplan, The Logic of Collective Belief, supra note 91, at 226. Cf. JOHN
MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND
MONEY 383 (1954) (noting that “the ideas of economists and political philosophers…are more powerful than is commonly understood,” and that “the world
is ruled by little else”).
93. This table appeared in Caplan, The Logic of Collective Belief, supra
note 91, at 227 (citing The Survey, Questions 27 and 29). Caplan also takes
up, and adequately treats, the “two main ways one might try to vindicate the
unbiasedness of non-economists’ economic beliefs. The first is to maintain
that the differences reflect economists’ self-serving biases…The second is that
economics attracts and/or molds individuals with specific ideological and political views.” Caplan, Systematically Biased Beliefs About Economics, supra
note 90, at 434 (citations ommitted).
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Table 1
Explanation
Too Many People are
on welfare.
Foreign aid spending
is too high.
There are too many
immigrants.
Companies are sending jobs overseas.
Business profits are
too high.
Technology is displacing workers.
Companies are downsizing.
Explanation

General Public
Major
Minor
Reason
Reason

Not a
Reason

No
Opinion

70*

22

7

1

66*

23

10

1

47

32*

19

1

68*

25

6

1

46

36*

17

1

46

38*

15

1

59*

30

9

2

Economists
Major
Minor
Reason
Reason

Not a
Reason

No
Opinion

Too many people are
11
50*
39
0
on welfare.
Foreign aid spending
1
13
86*
0
is too high.
There are too many
1
18
80*
<.5
immigrants.
Companies are send6
35
58*
<.5
ing jobs overseas.
Business profits are
4
11
85*
1
too high.
Technology is displac2
24
74*
<.5
ing workers.
Companies are down5
38
57*
0
sizing.
Source: Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy,
Questions 27 and 29 *=median belief

Caplan proposes a theory of “rational irrationality” to explain
the systematic divergence of populist beliefs from those of pro-
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fessionally trained economists.94 Put simply, relative prices
matter.95 People will choose to hold systematically biased beliefs based on little or no information with a high level of certitude when the private costs of error are negligible.96 Some beliefs, in other words, have practical consequences for the individual that holds them. But others do not. The rational irrationality model assumes that people have preferences for beliefs
themselves as well as for outcomes, and that when the private
costs of error are small enough, people can indulge their preferred beliefs.97
For example, if an individual believes that protectionist tariffs produce net gains for the economy, the private costs of error
are effectively zero. The odds of this individual’s vote changing
the outcome of an election are zero, so the odds of his belief ultimately “coming back to bite him” are zero. By contrast, if the
individual chooses to believe that the automobiles in the street
he is about to cross are mere apparitions, and that they may
therefore be disregarded, the costs that this erroneous belief
may impose on him are enormous. It should therefore come as
no surprise that few people are willing to believe that the automobiles in the street are apparitions, but that many people apparently believe that ghosts haunt houses. The former imposes
high private costs of error; the latter does not. Thus, if an indi94. See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 78. Friedman notes that his father-in-law would not consider questioning Friedman’s views on physics, a
subject in which Friedman holds a Ph.D. Nevertheless, Friedman’s father-inlaw is quick to disagree with Friedman’s views on economics, despite the fact
that Friedman has been writing and lecturing on economics for the past
twenty years, and his father-in-law, as Friedman notes, has never taken an
economics course in his life.
95. Caplan, The Logic of Collective Belief, supra note 91, at 227.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 227–28. See also McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 13, at 524.
The authors note:
[P]rotectionist groups enjoy an additional advantage: they can exploit
nationalist sentiments. These sentiments, which are often deeply
rooted in a country's tradition and culture, can have a positive impact
on politics by encouraging the production of public goods. For example, they facilitate the common defense and aid in rallying opposition
to totalitarian oppression, as in Eastern Europe at the end of the
Cold War.
Id. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON x (arguing that
irrationality may be biologically selected).
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vidual derives pleasure — consumption value — from the belief
that particular houses are haunted by ghosts, he may rationally
adopt this (irrational) belief, because holding the belief presumably imposes no private costs. Similarly, in the political
context, individual voters “can cheaply indulge their systematically biased beliefs at the ballot box knowing that they are extraordinarily unlikely to alter the outcome.”98
But the social costs — the costs in the aggregate — of rationally indulging irrational beliefs may be enormous. Political
markets represent the paradigmatic example. Individual voters
may cheaply indulge their private fantasies without their marginal vote affecting the election’s outcome, but when all rationally irrational voters do so, the outcome does vary. Accordingly,
the voter tendency toward rational irrationality threatens to
impose significant social costs — more so than those that might
flow from “mere” rational ignorance alone. Rationally ignorant
voters lack incentive to purchase information when the odds of
their “investment paying off” — i.e., their vote changing the
outcome of an election — are zero. But when information is
provided at no cost, e.g., through the media or political debates,
the rationally ignorant will at least process it. Rationally irrational voters, by contrast, already believe they have all the information they need, and will vote in accordance with their (irrational) beliefs.99 That is, “if voters are rationally ignorant
about the specifics of trade policy, they can still support general
procedures to curtail protectionist pressures. But such procedures would win no favor from voters who affirmatively favor
protectionism due to their rationally irrational overestimates of
the social benefits of protectionist policy.”100
98. Caplan, The Logic of Collective Belief, supra note 91, at 219 (also noting
that “voter rationality…will normally be an under-produced collective good”)
(citation ommitted).
99. Caplan, Rational Ignorance vs. Rational Irrationality, supra note 91, at
5.
100. Caplan, The Logic of Collective Belief, supra note 91, at 224. Caplan
further notes:
[T]he rationally ignorant at least acknowledge that they have [an information] problem, so they are open to compensatory political measures. Politicians who support such measures win the voters’ favor.
The rationally irrational, however, deny that they have a problem;
they don’t want the political system to “help them” overcome their ir-
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Politicians will naturally be sensitive to the belief systems of
their constituents. If the majority of voters believe that free
trade is an evil to be combated, then politicians must take heed,
and for the very same reasons that politicians are susceptible to
the influences of interest groups: if reelection and prestige are
the goals, then politicians must pay attention to the interest
groups (and class of voters) who make a difference in elections.101
Thus, the WTO is revealed to serve an additional, perhaps
“hidden,” purpose. It operates as a “scapegoat” for politicians
attempting to deflect the wrath of constituents angered by freetrade-oriented policies. Politicians may simply plead deference
to the WTO as necessary to achieve other, more worthy (read:
more popular), societal goals, while at the same time enjoying
the stream of benefits that flow from increased market access.
For example, a politician might claim that participation in the
various multilateral trade agreements administered by the
WTO is necessary to preserve diplomacy with foreign countries,
which in turn might be considered essential to the preservation
of human rights in impoverished countries — a more “noble”
goal in society’s eyes.102 Whether this is true or not is one thing;
rational biases. In their eyes, such compensatory political measures
are useless at best, and insulting at worst. Politicians who support
them have little to gain and much to lose.
Id. at 224.
101. If the excessive level of noise in political markets, coupled with rational
ignorance, precludes voters from checking harmful political behavior, supra
Section I.C, then concededly, the opposite might hold true as well. That is,
even if voters on balance oppose free trade, that factor is merely one of many
on the table during an election year, and the noise level in political markets
may therefore check the potential damage caused by this belief. But the irrational tendencies of voters nevertheless become relevant to the personal calculus of politicians because ignorance is no longer at issue; by hypothesis, many
voters go to the booths firmly believing that unencumbered free trade is an
evil that must be stopped. This tendency therefore threatens to impose
greater social costs than mere ignorance because voters cannot be persuaded
to adopt “rational” policies; they will simply believe what they want to believe.
102. See John O. McGinnis, World Trade Agreements: Advancing the Interests of the Poorest of Poor, 34 IND. L. REV. 1361, 1361–62 (2001) (noting that
free trade is a way to help the world’s poor, and that free trade agreements
help the expansion of civil rights in developing countries). McGinnis further
notes that multilateral trade agreements might actually advance human
rights more than The Universal Declaration and other human rights conventions, because expanding trade increases the wealth of foreign nations, which
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what matters from a politician’s perspective is simply whether
his constituency believes it.103
In summary, the multilateral treaties administered by the
WTO — at least to the extent that they call for increased market access under a reciprocity regime — mobilize domestic export interests and counteract the interest group pressure
mounted by domestic producers who stand to face increased
competition in the aftermath of increased domestic market access. Politicians in a position to support agreements calling for
increased market access will then prefer to act in furtherance of
this goal, because, in the aggregate, free trade will create
wealth. These politicians will then naturally take credit for
increased societal wealth, and will presumably explain these
benefits by reference to some domestic policy or other implemented by that politician. But what is more, to appease the
voter who, while enjoying the benefits of free trade, still condemns free-trade policies, politicians may simply plead deference to a multilateral trade agreement administered by the
WTO as if adherence to the agreement is some “necessary evil”
to achieve a greater good, thereby giving political actors the
best of all political worlds. Politicians will accordingly reap all
the benefits of free trade without assuming personal responsibility for its “evils” in the eyes of those constituents who believe
free trade should be curbed.104 Accordingly, even though the
will result in higher revenue for the local despot. Offering market access as
“bait” to improve human rights conditions may therefore be more effective
than human rights conventions themselves. Id. Thus, trade agreements actually do operate as “means” to the end of human rights and other “greater
goods.” Nevertheless, a politician sensitive to the fact that the majority of his
constituents may actually oppose free trade will have an incentive to bifurcate
human rights and trade and treat the latter as a “necessary evil.”
103. See, e.g., Judy Keen, Cheney Balances Public, Private Diplomacy, USA
TODAY, Mar. 19, 2002, at A12 (Vice-President Cheney’s aides explaining that
“political considerations sometimes require leaders to say things publicly that
contradict what they say in private”). But cf. Caplan, The Logic of Collective
Belief, supra note 91, at 234 (noting that politicians who actually share the
irrational beliefs of their constituents may enjoy a competitive advantage over
political competitors who do not).
104. It is interesting to speculate on how international politics produced the
WTO in the first place. As noted above, the immediate impetus for the creation of the WTO was to correct the failures of GATT. It may seem strangely
fortuitous, however, that the world political system would produce an organization for correcting national (domestic) political failures. In fact, it is very
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majority of voters may believe that free trade causes harm,
playing the WTO as a scapegoat makes support of increased
market access politically feasible.105
CONCLUSION
The average voter may irrationally believe that free trade is
an evil that should be combated, but, on the theoretical model
proposed by this Article, the costs these beliefs threaten to impose are reduced by the WTO. Irrational beliefs that impose no
private costs may, in general, impose great social costs in the
aggregate — particularly in the context of political elections,
where an entire electorate indulging their bliss beliefs may
eventually bring about socially disastrous policies. But at least
insofar as free trade is concerned, if the average voter believes
that adherence to the WTO is a necessary means to achieving a
more worthy end, then voters will tolerate the increased market
access mandated by the WTO’s multilateral treaties, and society will continue to enjoy the benefits that flow from free trade.

unlikely that the WTO was created for this reason. But if it was not created
for this purpose, then perhaps there is less reason to believe these good (and
unintended) effects will last.
105. It may be questioned whether using the WTO in this manner is not
without its own set of costs. For example, perhaps “playing the WTO as a
scapegoat” further encourages the (possible) natural hypocrisy of political
actors, or contributes to the accumulation of public disinformation. It may
even be said that by playing the scapegoat card, the WTO negotiating process
may itself become distorted, because without proper negotiating alignments
internally, parties may not have the best-laid agendas. These are all points
worthy of consideration. Nevertheless, for present purposes, the thesis of this
Article is simply — and is limited in scope to stating — that rational irrationality poses a problem to the proliferation of free trade agendas, but that it
turns out that the WTO’s status as a potential whipping child has the unintended, and somewhat surprising, consequence of making free trade more
palatable.

